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INDEX

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Khrushchev's January 6 Speech
2. Laos
3. US-Soviet Relations
4. Soviet-UAR Relations
5. Khrushchev Plans to Visit Africa
6. Cuba
7. Soviet Reaction to Iranian Elections

INTERNAL

8. Central Committee Plenum
9. Leadership-Additions to Presidium
10. Continuing Vigilance Campaign

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

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1. Khrushchev's January 6 Speech. (CONFIDENTIAL): Khrushchev's speech on the Moscow meeting of Communist Parties, given to party organizations of the Higher Party School, Academy of Social Sciences, and Institute of Marxism-Leninism on January 6, was published on January 17. It seems to bring together in one place Khrushchev's point of view as a communist and propagandist on the main issues affecting the world communist movement. If taken literally it is a declaration of cold war and is expressed in far stronger and more explicit terms than the December Statement of Communist Parties.

Most of the substance of the speech is not new although this is the first time indicated in public that the projected 20 years plan runs from 1960. Khrushchev also revised the Stalin thesis that wars among imperialist states are more likely than war between the two camps. The passage concerning the possibility that the USSR would not indefinitely increase steel production after the yearly 100 million ton level is reached seems, among other passages, to indicate that Khrushchev wishes to give greater emphasis than in the past to out-production of the West of consumer goods as a decisive factor in the communist world struggle. The speech was replete with passages which clearly refer to the argument with the Chinese Communists.

2. Laos. While Laos was described as before as a principal danger spot in the world in Soviet government and party documents and daily press coverage, the Soviet public was given little true idea of why the Laotian situation is a threat to peace, other then insistence of the claim that the Eisenhower Administration in its last days was acting like a desperate gambler by assisting "rebels" against the "legal government" of Laos. Soviet readers also were not told what other countries are doing to ease tension over Laos and, of course, were given no idea of what contributions the USSR and other communist states have made to creating this tension.

Soviet public media did not give a clear picture of whether the USSR will insist on an international conference of the 1954 Geneva type or along the lines proposed by Sihanouk or whether reactivation of the ICC in Laos would be the principal or only feasible means for preventing the Laotian situation from getting out of hand. On balance press comment suggested that the Soviets would prefer an international conference. This would enable the communists to press for new ICC terms of reference with regard to the Pathet Lao position in Laos, might be a better means for strengthening Souvanna's position, would provide a breathing space (in view of the US statement that it is considering Sihanouk's conference proposal) until the new administration in Washington has had an opportunity to review Laos, would afford means of engaging the US in the problem of Chicom international status, and would promote the Soviet objective of a three-bloc breakdown in international negotiations. The Soviets have distorted the picture of US-Soviet relations regarding Laos. Only warnings to the US by the Soviet Government have been reported in the press, and such moves as Ambassador Menshikov's Jan. 10 call on Secretary Herter has never been

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reported in the press here. On Jan. 16 Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov summoned Ambassador Thompson and gave him an oral statement [redacted] B1

[redacted] In this connection the Soviet press has spoken ominously about volunteers. It also charges US pilots are operating planes in Laos, and that US planes are airlifting Laotian troops. These charges, which have been based on alleged Western press reports, convey the picture that the US has passed over from covert to open intervention.

The military picture presented has been one of desertions and heavy casualties, panic and lack of control of the situation beyond a few big cities on the part of the Boun Oum government and heavy through vain reliance on troops supplied by the GRC, Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. The capture of a number of areas was claimed and almost daily there were reports that the Boun Oum government is preparing and in fact has already started to move from Vientiane to Savannakhet. Parallel with this projection of the military picture were claims that the US is itself isolated politically on Laos and that only Thailand and possibly South Vietnam, South Korea, the GRC, and the Philippines are with the US on Laos.

3. US-Soviet Relations: As the end of President Eisenhower's administration has approached the Soviet press and TV has sharply increased the volume and sharpness of their attacks against the President. Developments such as the State of the Union message, the budget message and the farewell conference were used as pegs for strong denunciations of "The Eisenhower-Nixon cold war policy," and a spate of analyses were published under such headings "as the end of eight ignominous years." The propaganda output invariably reiterated the standard Soviet charges that US policy toward Cuba, Laos, NATO nuclear armament, colonialism and the U-2 and RB-47 demonstrate the aggressiveness of the Eisenhower-Nixon administration. Unfavorable comparison of the President to Coolidge and Grant were repeated from foreign press articles, and the President has been ridiculed on a daily basis in Soviet cartoons.

Soviet complaints of the alleged "buzzing" of Soviet ships by US aircraft and naval craft has also noticeably increased in the past two weeks. In a press conference on Jan. 12 given by Soviet Minister of Merchant Fleet BAKAEV, the Soviets charged the US with more than 200 incidents in the period August-September 1960. Several pictures were used in the subsequent press exploitation of the conference, portraying US aircraft making passes over the Soviet tankers. This campaign received fresh impetus on Jan. 18-19 in the publication of three charges involving American destroyers from the 6th Fleet which allegedly passed dangerously close to Soviet tankers in the Arabian and Red Seas.

The imminent inauguration of President Kennedy has been noted in most papers in a bland and even hopeful way in keeping with the cautious but positive Soviet position on US-Soviet relations following the change in administrations.

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4. Soviet-UAR Relations. In a brief TASS report from Rome, Pravda on January 20 reported the arrest of 200 more Communists and communist sympathizers in Egypt. Quoting from the Italian paper Unita the report complained "it is impossible not to note and not to condemn the contradictory character of the policy followed by the Egyptian government and President Nasser of supporting the essential strengthening of the fight against imperialism for the complete freedom of Africa and Asia and at the same time ordering the arrest of the best Egyptian patriots and fighters against imperialism...." The terse criticism in Pravda stands in sharp contrast to the warm ceremonial reception given to UAR Marshal Amer on his recent visit to Moscow.

5. Khrushchev Plans to Visit Africa. Indications that Khrushchev will visit Africa in the near future were strengthened this week by the publication on Jan 17 of a message from Togo Premier Olympia in which he officially invited Khrushchev to Togo and agreed to visit the USSR. Olympia reportedly stated that he has extended the invitation "having learned that Khrushchev plans to visit several states in West Africa."

Although no specific mention was made of a Khrushchev visit to Sudan, the appearance in Pravda on Jan. 18 of a statement that Sudanese leader Abkoud will soon visit the USSR also suggested a possibility of a return visit.

6. Cuba. Soviet propaganda on Cuba has dropped off significantly both in terms of volume and intensity since the end of the UN Security Council debate on Cuban charges against the US. However, a steady stream of feature articles and TV reports on domestic Cuban reforms have continued to appear and a series of "solidarity meetings" is apparently being sponsored by the Soviet trade unions in Soviet factories.

The most significant aspect of Soviet material on Cuba in the past week has been the sporadic but continuing appearance of charges that the US is using Guantanamo to train counterrevolutionary forces. It is also significant that several Cuban statements have been reported here insisting that force will never be resorted to in order to resolve the base issue because the US will eventually have to withdraw of its own accord.

7. Soviet Reaction to Iranian Elections. The first Soviet reaction to the recent elections was published in a critical Izvestiya article Jan 17 under the caption "Comedy Repeats Itself." The article emphasized that the present election represents no change from last year's elections. The restrictions of suffrage both in terms of the very limited number of voters and the ban on female suffrage, according to Izvestiya, render the results worthless. The Iranian regime was also accused of restricting the number of parties to three, all of which are controlled and favorable to the present regime. In conclusion, the article claims that even with these built-in safeguards the Iranian regime is pursuing a course of strong-arm tactics at the polls in order to guarantee the desired results.

INTERNAL

8. Central Committee Plenum. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Soviet press Jan 20 published Plenum's concluding position statements (postanovleniye) on agriculture and on results November Communist and Workers' Parties Conference. It is still unknown whether texts of Khrushchev's pre-plenum guidance memorandum to Central Committee, the circulated outline theses of his speech, and the speech itself (Jan 17) will be made public, or whether M.A. Suslov's plenum report on results November conference will be published, especially in view of publication of Khrushchev's speech of January 6 on this topic (see above).

The sheer volume of materials may account for failure to publish or even summarize a number of lesser speeches made during final days of plenum. Those which were given press attention bore out impressions of plenum reported last week (Weeka No. 2 of Jan 13). Serious assessment of many revealed shortcomings in Soviet agriculture in 1960, warnings that incompetence will no longer be tolerated and that "criminal" attempts to cheat or deceive the state by padding or falsifying reports and other means will be met by dismissals from position, ejection from party and criminal prosecution appeared also in plenum's final position statement on agriculture.

9. Leadership-Additions to Presidium: A brief statement published at the end of the plenum announced the election January 18 to candidate membership on CC Presidium of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Chairman V.V.Grishin and Orenburg Oblast First Secretary G. I. Voronov, thus bringing candidate membership up to 9 persons and the Presidium total to 23. Although it would have been difficult to predict their selection on the record of their positions and past activities relative to those of numerous other influential and highly placed individuals (including many republic first secretaries) over whose heads Grishin and Voronov seem to have been "promoted," it accords with current policy emphasis on increased international communist and related activity and an accelerated rate of agricultural development. As it seems likely Grishin retains AUCCTU chairmanship and vice-presidency of WFTU, his role in international labor circles may be enhanced and Soviet activity in this field increased. The fact that Orenburg Oblast and by implication its first secretary, a former USSR deputy minister of agriculture, are credited with notable agricultural success in a generally poor year probably was a factor in the choice of Voronov. "Voronov's party experience has included the first secretaryship in Chita Oblast, and Grishin was second secretary for Moscow Oblast prior to replacing N. M. Shvernik as AUCCTU chairman in March 1956. Both have been members of the Central Committee since the 19th Party Congress in 1952.)

The first additions to the Presidium since the election of N. V. Podgornyy and D. S. Polyanskiy in June 1958, selection of Grishin (46) and Voronov (50) further increases the proportion of relatively youthful leaders who are not influenced by first hand revolutionary or early post-revolution experience. By now only 14 of the total 23 persons on the

Presidium are 55 or older and two, O. V. Kuusinen (79) and Shvernik (72) are sufficiently elderly as to make their early "retirement" a likely prospect.

If, as possible, not all personnel actions taken by the plenum have been announced, they, D. A. Korotchenko (he and Shvernik have not been accounted for in public appearanced recently) or others blamed for regional agricultural deficiencies may prove to have been affected. However, it seems more likely that additional changes in Presidium membership will await a subsequent plenum, possibly the first plenum of the new Central Committee to be elected by the 22nd Party Congress in October at which time agricultural and other progress during 1961 can be assessed.

Khrushchev not only maintained a high level of personal activity at the plenum but found time and energy for normal protocol and other functions then and since. With 13 of his Presidium associates, he attended a Bolshoi Theatre performance the evening of January 17, and January 19 showed up with Mikoyan and Madame Furtseva at an "Old Vic" performance after having "taken part" that same day (with A.N. Kosygin) in the current All-Union Conference of Cellulose and Paper Industry officials.

10. Continuing Vigilance Campaign: The vigilance campaign which had been intensified by the issuance with voluminous press commentary of the Soviet "white book" on US espionage Caught in the Act is continuing. Pravda, which previously had not mentioned the book, carried a commentary in its Jan. 18 issue, and a booklet entitled On Political Vigilance of the Soviet People containing much of the same information as Caught in the Act has been issued in 70,600 copies (in Russian -- primarily for internal consumption). In an article "Guides or Spies," Izvestiya of Jan. 17 gave the impression that US-Soviet cultural exchanges suffer because Soviet tourists and delegations in the US are under constant FBI surveillance and surrounded by CIA agents and spies posing as guides and "State Department representatives" who try to subvert Soviet citizens or extract secret information. One of thevarious persons named as typical by Izvestiya, Francis Stevens, was said "more than once to have been in Moscow under roof of US Embassy." There also have been several articles on US efforts (sometimes via emigree organizations) in West Germany to exploit Soviet defectors, train them as spies for despatching into USSR and to thwart the desire of defectors and other Soviet citizens to return home (Soviet Russia of Jan. 14 and 15, "Prisoner of 'Free World'"; Izvestiya of Jan. 18, "Hell and Back"; and one of the 12 anti-West and particularly anti-US and anti-West German essays in a booklet by L. Sheynin Brand of the Damned which started selling in Moscow early this week.)

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